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REFORMS TO CURB CORRUPTION AND THE  
APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION 
Kevin Weber∗
 
Money, like water, will always find an outlet.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 15, 2004, New Jersey Senate President Richard 
Codey assumed the office of Governor of New Jersey,2 following the 
resignation of Governor James E. McGreevey.3  Among his pledges 
upon assuming office4 was to end the practice in New Jersey known as 
“pay-to-play.”5  “‘Pay-to-play’ is the political practice of rewarding 
campaign contributors with no-bid government contracts.”6  Critics 
 ∗ J.D., 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; Master of Public Policy, 2004, 
Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University; B.A., 
2002, Rutgers College, Rutgers University. 
 1 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).  This quotation 
from Justice O’Connor is based on the understanding that as government keeps 
regulating political contributions and advocacy, the money finds new outlets.  See also 
Kathleen Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 312 
(1998) (“[T]he restriction on formal campaign contributions has had predictable 
substitution effects. Barred from giving to candidates or limited in the amount that 
they can give, corporations, labor unions, [Political Action Committees], and wealthy 
individuals have shifted resources into other forms of political advocacy and associa-
tion.”). 
 2 See N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, ¶ 6. 
 3 Laura Mansnerus, A Governor Resigns: Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at A1. 
 4 Richard J. Codey, Acting New Jersey Governor, State of the State Address (Jan. 
11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/speech 
?contentId=16583). 
 5 Id. (“Governor McGreevey’s Executive Order on pay to play . . . must become a 
permanent law.  And I am 100% committed to getting that done in the very near fu-
ture.”). 
 6 Paula A. Franzese & Daniel J. O’Hern, Sr., Restoring the Public Trust: An Agenda 
for Ethics Reform of State Government and a Proposed Model for New Jersey, 57 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1175, 1222 (2005). 
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describe pay-to-play as a hidden tax, as it increases the cost of gov-
ernment.7
Shortly before leaving office, Governor McGreevey signed an 
Executive Order to ban this practice,8 and upon taking office, Gover-
nor Codey promised to push the legislature to codify the Executive 
Order in legislation.9  Among Governor Codey’s promises and pro-
posals to reform the broken system were the creation of an inde-
pendent state ethics commission, a new plain-language ethics guide 
for state employees, a new business ethics guide, stiffer penalties for 
ethical transgressions, and greater public disclosure.10  Arguably, the 
most important and most public of his proposals was the proposed 
statute banning pay-to-play. 
In response to New Jersey’s perceived culture of corruption and 
“[s]candals [that] have shaken the public’s trust,” there was a public 
outcry to reform the state’s campaign finance system.11  Accusations 
of pay-to-play were common, touching both Republicans12 and De-
mocrats13 in recent years.  However, as insidious and corrupting as 
this confluence of money and politics appeared to be, it was never-
theless perfectly legal in New Jersey, so long as there was no “quid pro 
quo.”14  Under New Jersey law, specifically the Local Public Contracts 
Law and the Criminal Code, a campaign contribution donated in ex-
change for a government contract is, in fact, illegal, but “the problem 
is proving the connection between the contributions and the con-
tract.”15  Thus, as proving the illegal quid pro quo is often largely fu-
tile, New Jersey’s elected officials took the next logical step: attempt-
ing to tighten the restrictions on campaign contributions from 
businesses holding and seeking public contracts. 
 7 James Prado Roberts & Paul D’Ambrosio, Ante Up, if You Want to Get in the 
Game, ASBURY PARK PRESS, June 6, 2004. 
 8 Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (Sept. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm. 
 9 Codey, supra note 4. 
 10 Franzese & O’Hern, supra note 6, at 1177. 
 11 Id. at 1176; see also NJ.com, Corruption, http://www.nj.com/corruption (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2008) (collecting investigative reports on New Jersey corruption). 
 12 David Kocieniewski, Errors Emerge as Exhaust Test Is Introduced in New Jersey, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at B1 (recounting accusations of pay-to-play in Republican Gov-
ernor Christine Whitman’s administration). 
 13 Laura Mansnerus, Who Are the Lawyers Packing All the Clout?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2005, § 14, at 1 (showing that law firms donating to the Democrats received favorable 
public contracts). 
 14 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:44A-20 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (noting that prohib-
ited donations include anything that “seek[s] to influence the content, introduction, 
passage or defeat of legislation”). 
 15 Franzese & O’Hern, supra note 6, at 1222. 
WEBER (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:40:47 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1445 
 
This Comment discusses the recent history of New Jersey’s cam-
paign finance reform, specifically the 2004–2005 pay-to-play reforms, 
and argues that the current statutory framework fails to curb actual 
corruption, as well as the appearance of corruption, in New Jersey 
politics.  Part II of this Comment defines political corruption, and 
traces the history of political corruption in New Jersey.  Part III exam-
ines the current statutory framework of New Jersey’s campaign fi-
nance system, discusses the current law on restricting political contri-
butions, and examines the first challenge to the pay-to-play statute.  
Part IV examines the failures of New Jersey’s campaign finance 
scheme, including the loopholes that businesses, contributors, and 
politicians use to exploit the system.  Part V discusses proposed meas-
ures to fix the system, including proposed bills in the New Jersey Leg-
islature and an examination of campaign finance laws in other states.  
Part VI concludes by describing what measures should be taken to fix 
the current problem and detailing which provisions of the current 
system should be left unchanged. 
II. DEFINING CORRUPTION AND TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF 
CORRUPTION IN NEW JERSEY 
A. Corruption of Officials, Corruption of the Voter 
New Jersey has a sordid history of political corruption16 dating 
back to the days of “Boss” Frank Hague,17 the mayor of Jersey City 
from 1917 to 1947, who oversaw a machine of patronage and kick-
backs.18  However, an elected official can still be “corrupted” without 
receiving an outright bribe: 
[o]nce we get beyond classical corruption, political spending is 
useful to a politician to the extent, and only to the extent, that it 
enables him to attain or retain office. For money to “corrupt,” 
then, an elected official must be able to shade his conduct away 
from what a constituent-serving or public-regarding representa-
tive would do . . . .19
 16 See NJ.com, Corruption, http://www.nj.com/corruption (last visited Feb. 20, 
2008) (collecting investigative reports on New Jersey political corruption). 
 17 Staff Report, Who’s the Boss?, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 24, 
2004, at A7. 
 18 Joseph Sullivan, The Trial of Hudson Corruption Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1983, 
§ 4, at 6 (noting that Frank Hague was “a figure who dominated state politics for four 
decades and who laughed at investigations aimed at uncovering how he became a 
millionaire on a mayor’s salary”). 
 19 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1720 (1999). 
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That is, an official is “corrupted” if a campaign donation changed his 
vote or executive decision from what he otherwise would have done.  
In Colorado Republican II,20 Justice Souter defined “corruption [as] be-
ing understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue 
influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such 
influence.” 21  Thus, campaign donations, arguably, have the ability to 
corrupt an official as much as an outright bribe.  While some com-
mentators argue that campaign finance reform has largely been a 
failure in practice, as the money of advocates always finds an outlet 
(i.e., politicians continue to be actually corrupted despite increased 
regulation),22 it must be remembered that the purpose of campaign 
finance reform is not only to stop actual corruption, but the appear-
ance of corruption as well.23  Beginning with the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo,24 the Court noted that “the pri-
mary interest served by [campaign finance regulations] . . . is the pre-
vention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the 
real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions 
on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.”25
While outright bribery certainly still exists, at times, in New Jer-
sey,26 a more subtle form of corruption has largely replaced the ex-
plicit pay-off.  Today, favoritism in the awarding of public contracts 
and access to decision-makers is insidiously traded for large campaign 
donations, fundamentally replacing the direct kickback of years past.  
In recent years, as the cost of campaigns in the media age has in-
creased exponentially, politicians have aggressively increased their 
fundraising operations.27  As there is “near-universal agreement that 
 20 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 
 21 Id. at 441 (citing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t Political Action Comm., 528 
U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000)). 
 22 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 1, at 311. 
 23 Dennis Thompson, Law and Democracy: A Symposium on the Law Governing Our 
Democratic Process: Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1036 (2005) (“Why should campaigns be regulated?  To 
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption is the answer the Supreme 
Court gives in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n . . . .”). 
 24 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 25 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
 26 Ronald Smothers, 11 Officials in New Jersey Snared After 4-Year Operation by F.B.I., 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at A1. 
 27 Rachel Leon, Cash and Carry Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, § 14, at 13 
(Op-Ed).  Leon, the executive director of Common Cause New York, notes that 
“when adjusted for inflation, the cost of a winning campaign has more than doubled 
since 1986, and has increased sixfold since 1990.”  Id.  Though Leon uses data for 
New York state candidates, as most New Jersey state candidates advertise in the New 
York media market, the results would likely be similar. 
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the functional relationship between political spending and political 
success is essentially positive,”28 there is no reason to believe that poli-
ticians will not spend as much as they can possibly raise in the fore-
seeable future.29  This recent trend of hyper-elevated spending on 
campaigns has been called “corruption of the voter.”30  As candidates 
and elected officials continue to accept donations to buy media and 
advertising to influence voters, it becomes the voter who is corrupted, 
essentially bought-off with slickly produced advertisements, their at-
tention diverted from more civic-minded questions when casting 
their votes.31
A difficult question arises when attempting to discern the differ-
ence between permissible levels of influence and illegal corruption.  
The vital difference, it has been argued, is the link between the 
money and the official action.  “Only when the connection between 
the contribution and some favor is especially close should there be 
any reason to worry about corruption . . . .  [T]he connection be-
tween the contribution and the favor must be close in two senses: 
proximate in time and explicit in word or deed.”32  Some would argue 
that “[c]ampaign finance reform protects the integrity of the Ameri-
can political-governmental process.”33  While this may be true as a 
general proposition, politicians in New Jersey recently have seemed 
more concerned with only curbing the appearance of corruption, 
rather than attempting to curb the actual corruptive influence of 
money on the system.34  A somewhat cynical view would be that New 
Jersey politicians passed a faux reform, rife with loopholes and the 
benefit of which was marginal at best, in an effort to appear vigilant 
on corruption while preserving the status quo. 
 28 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 19, at 1708–09. 
 29 Joe Donahue, Lawmakers Break the Bank on Races, TRENTON TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, 
at A1 (noting that spending on New Jersey’s legislative campaigns ballooned from 
$57 million in 2003 to $69 million in 2007). 
 30 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 19, at 1708 (“[F]or all the rhetorical focus on 
money’s role in corrupting candidates and elected officials, the critical problem 
turns out to be that political money corrupts voters.”) (emphasis added). 
 31 See Thompson, supra note 23, at 1037 (referring to the diversion of the elector-
ate from civic minded questions as “electoral corruption”). 
 32 Id. at 1044. 
 33 Mark C. Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform: Central Meaning and a New Ap-
proach, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 768 (2003). 
 34 Jason Method, Codey: Existing Reforms Largely Sufficient, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Sept. 
30, 2007, available at http://www.app.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070930/ 
NEWS/70930003/0/SPECIAL10 (quoting Senate President Codey as saying, “[w]e 
can pass all the laws to try and stop corruption, but someone who is determined to be 
corrupt is not going to be stopped by any laws”). 
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B. Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption in New Jersey 
One of the most prolific sources of campaign cash in New Jersey 
has been those firms and companies seeking lucrative government 
contracts.  In New Jersey, the state’s contract procurement laws say 
that the contract does not need to go to the lowest bidder.35  The 
State can accept whichever bid it feels will “be most advantageous to 
the State, price and other factors considered.”36  Thus, state officials 
have tremendous latitude when doling out contracts, with little to 
stop an official from steering a contract to whomever he or she 
chooses, including a campaign supporter.37
Between 1994 and 2001, the administration of Republican Gov-
ernor Christine Whitman received some negative press attention 
when the state awarded a $463 million contract for auto emissions 
testing to the Parsons Infrastructure and Technology Company.38  
Campaign finance reports reveal that Parsons made $62,000 in cam-
paign contributions to Republican committees.39  While there were 
never any allegations that campaign dollars were traded quid pro quo 
for preferential treatment, the appearance of impropriety existed to 
many observers, and the State Senate conducted hearings on the mat-
ter.40
The subsequent administration of Democratic Governor James 
McGreevey was no different, and the practice of pay-to-play contin-
ued.  In fact, after leaving office, McGreevey admitted that nobody 
“benefited from ‘pay-to-play’ more than [he] did.”41  Upon taking of-
fice in 2001, several supporters of Governor McGreevey’s past cam-
paigns received lucrative contracts.42  The years of the Whitman ad-
ministration were lean for some firms and corporations with strong 
Democratic Party ties, and the incoming administration was a chance 
to reclaim some of these extremely lucrative public contracts.43
 35 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007). 
 36 Id. § 52:34-12(g). 
 37 See Commercial Cleaning Corp. v. Sullivan, 47 N.J. 539, 548 (1966) (holding 
that the Executive branch has broad discretion under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12 to 
“determine who is the ‘responsible bidder,’ [and] which bid will be most advanta-
geous to the State, ‘price and other factors considered’”). 
 38 Kocieniewski, supra note 12, at B1. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Iver Peterson, Public’s Chance to Inspect Emissions-Test Contracting, N.Y. TIMES, July 
10, 2001, at B5. 
 41 JAMES E. MCGREEVEY WITH DAVID FRANCE, THE CONFESSION 337 (2006). 
 42 Mansnerus, supra note 13, at § 14, 1. 
 43 Id.  “One firm closely identified with the McGreevey administration was 
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer of  Woodbridge, where Mr. McGreevey was mayor.  
When he took office, Mr. McGreevey rewarded Wilentz with a new client, the enor-
WEBER (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:40:47 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1449 
 
Rewarding your supporters and hurting your enemies is business 
as usual in New Jersey,44 and is not limited to the state level.  Outright 
corruption, as well as pay-to-play, is practiced at the local level as well.  
Straightforward bribery exists in both upper-class suburbia45 and 
poorer inner-cities46 in New Jersey as does legal pay-to-play, where 
municipal and county officials grant contracts and receive corporate 
campaign contributions.47
III. REFORMING NEW JERSEY’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM AND THE 
CURRENT LAW 
A. An Attempt at Reforming Pay-to-Play 
On August 12, 2004, Governor McGreevey announced that he 
would resign, effective November 15, 2004.48  As a “lame duck” and 
saying he felt liberated49 from the corruptive influence of the political 
bosses who wield incredible influence in New Jersey through the pay-
to-play process,50 Governor McGreevey issued Executive Order No. 
134 on September 22, 2004.51  McGreevey later called this an “atom 
bomb in the world of New Jersey politics.”52  The governor’s intention 
was to “insulate the negotiation and award of State contracts from po-
litical contributions that pose the risk of improper influence, pur-
mous Turnpike Authority; he took it away from the Republican favorite Riker, Dan-
zig, Scherer, Hyland & Peretti.”  Id.  Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer made extensive 
contributions to Governor McGreevey’s campaign.  Id. 
 44 Richard Lezin Jones, State Senator Who Combines Donations, Law Practice, and In-
fluence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at B1.  State Senator Raymond Lesniak spoke regard-
ing the connection between his financial support to candidates and subsequent con-
tracts for his firm.  Id.  “People say, ‘You raise money for people who get elected and 
then they hire your law firm.’ I go, ‘Shocking, isn’t it?’ Are you supposed to hire 
people who donated to your opponent?”  Id. 
 45 Smothers, supra note 26, at A1. 
 46 David Halbfinger, Hudson County Leader Quits Amid Signs of Federal Inquiry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at B2. 
 47 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 44, at B1; Staff Report, supra note 17, at A7.  Control-
ling these local fiefdoms that grant contracts totaling billions of dollars each year is 
arguably as important as influencing the award of contracts at the state level.  Id. 
 48 Laura Mansnerus, McGreevey Steps Down After Disclosing a Gay Affair, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2004, at A1. 
 49 MCGREEVEY WITH FRANCE, supra note 41, at 336–40. 
 50 Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm (describing the power of 
county bosses in the preamble). 
 51 Id. 
 52 MCGREEVEY WITH FRANCE, supra note 41, at 336–40. 
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chase of access, or the appearance thereof.”53  The Executive Order 
directed that the state 
shall not enter into an agreement or otherwise contract to pro-
cure from any business entity services or any material, supplies or 
equipment, or to acquire, sell, or lease any land or building, 
where the value of the transaction exceeds $17,500, if that busi-
ness entity has solicited or made any contribution of money, or 
pledge of contribution, including in-kind contributions to a can-
didate committee and/or election fund of any candidate or 
holder of the public office of Governor, or to any State or county 
political party committee . . . .54
There was some initial veiled displeasure with Governor McGreevey’s 
Executive Order.  One prominent Democrat, Assembly Majority 
Leader Joseph Roberts, asked the non-partisan Office of Legislative 
Services for an opinion as to whether the Governor had the power to 
issue such a law via an executive order, bypassing the legislature.55  
The opinion letter from the Office of Legislative Services agreed that 
the Executive Order “infringes upon the lawmaking power of the leg-
islature and does not ‘comport with the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers.’”56
The questionable legality of the Executive Order was problem-
atic for the incoming Governor Codey, who in his State of the State 
address soon after assuming office pledged a reformist and ethical 
course for New Jersey.57  Governor Codey would soon deliver on his 
pledge to codify McGreevey’s Executive Order into legislation.  On 
March 22, 2005, Governor Codey signed bill A1500/S2052,58 which 
his press release trumpeted as “one of the nation’s strongest statewide 
pay-to-play bans.”59
 53 See Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Letter from Albert Porroni, Legislative Counsel, Office of Legislative Services, 
to Hon. Joseph Roberts, Assemblyman (Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with author). 
 56 Id. (quoting Commc’ns Workers v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 450–51 (1992)). 
 57 Codey, supra note 4 (“I assumed this office at a time of political upheaval . . . .  
Our faith in government had been shaken. But this moment in history has given us 
the opportunity to chart a new course. Together, we have begun to restore faith, in-
tegrity, and hope to our government.”). 
 58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 59 Press Release, Acting Governor Richard Codey, Codey Signs Pay-to-Play Ban 
into Law (Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/governor/ 
njnewsline/view_article.pl?id=2427. 
WEBER (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:40:47 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1451 
 
The language of this bill was virtually identical to Governor 
McGreevey’s Executive Order, other than a new section60 that said 
that this new law “shall not . . . apply in circumstances when it is de-
termined by the federal government or a court of competent jurisdic-
tion that its application would violate federal law or regulation.”61  
The legislature added this passage as a significant problem emerged.  
According to the Federal Highway Administration, New Jersey’s pay-
to-play ban violated federal law.62  The federal government de-
manded that New Jersey abandon its new pay-to-play law, or else it 
would freeze “hundreds of millions of dollars in federal road funds” 
headed for New Jersey, as the federal government claimed it was a 
violation of federal competitive-bidding laws.63 Acting Governor 
Codey challenged the Federal Highway Administration’s position in 
court64 but was unsuccessful.65  The added language of section 20.25 
would apparently allow the ban on pay-to-play to remain but kept a 
loophole for projects that received federal highway dollars.66
This was not the only problem that arose with the new legisla-
tion.  In his Executive Order, McGreevey acknowledged the fluid na-
ture of money in New Jersey politics, that is, that improper donations 
did not necessarily need to flow directly to the public official they 
were meant to influence.67  In New Jersey, it is often the political 
bosses68 of New Jersey’s twenty-one counties who “through their pow-
ers of endorsement, fundraising, ballot slogan or party line designa-
tion, and other means, exert significant influence over” candidates 
for public office.69  Thus, pay-to-play is arguably more pervasive at the 
 60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.25 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Certification of Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel J. Gibbons at 22, New Jersey 
v. Mineta, No. 05-228 (D.N.J. 2005).  Exhibit 10 is the final legal opinion from the 
Federal Highway Administration to the New Jersey Department of Transportation, 
where the federal government argued that the pay-to-play ban violated 23 U.S.C. § 
112 (2006).  Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Brief of Plaintiff, New Jersey v. Norman Y. Mineta, No. 05-228 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 65 Editorial, ‘Pay to Play’ in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A26.  State cam-
paign finance laws are preempted by federal law.  See 2 U.S.C. § 453 (2000). 
 66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.25 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 67 Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm.  Note the preamble about 
power of county bosses and their influence on the political process.  Id. 
 68 See Paul D’Ambrosio, Like Puppeteers, Bosses Pull the Strings, ASBURY PARK PRESS 
(Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 24, 2004, at A1. 
 69 Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm. 
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local and county level, an area often unseen by the public, as it is less 
scrutinized by the media. 
However, what Executive Order No. 134 and the subsequent leg-
islation did not do was ban pay-to-play on the local and county level.70  
Moreover, there was concern and speculation that the new state law 
preempted local governments from enacting more stringent cam-
paign finance restrictions and bans on pay-to-play in their own juris-
dictions.71  Under state law 
the local governmental units of this State may neither enact nor 
enforce any ordinance or other local law or regulation conflicting 
with, or preempted by, any provision of this code or with any pol-
icy of this State expressed by this code, whether that policy be ex-
pressed by inclusion of a provision in the code or by exclusion of 
that subject from the code.72
Seemingly, this statutory language would preempt a municipality 
from enacting a law banning pay-to-play, as campaign finance was an 
area reserved for regulation at the state level.73
Governor Codey and the pro-reformists in the legislature began 
to take steps to pass the so-called enabling legislation which would al-
low local governments to pass ordinances banning pay-to-play in their 
jurisdictions.  Under this new law 
[a] county, municipality, independent authority, board of educa-
tion, or fire district is hereby authorized to establish by ordinance, 
resolution or regulation, as may be appropriate, measures limiting 
the awarding of public contracts therefrom to business entities 
that have made a contribution... and limiting the contributions 
that the holders of a contract can make during the term of a con-
tract, notwithstanding the provisions and parameters of [the 
State’s pay-to-play ban].74
This new law allowed local governments to enact their own, more 
stringent, reform packages.  As of June 2007, by one newspaper’s 
count, eighty-one of New Jersey’s 566 municipalities had enacted 
some form of their own pay-to-play reform.75  This was a major victory 
 70 Id.  The Executive Order explicitly states that it applies to the state and gover-
nor candidates.  Id. 
 71 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5(d) (West 2005) (local ordinances are preempted 
by state statutes in some areas). 
 72 Id. 
 73 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, ¶ 11. 
 74 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:11-51 (West 1993 & Supp. 2007). 
 75 Editorial, Pay-to-Play Stays; Status Quid Pro Quo Rules Too Many Towns, BERGEN 
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), June 19, 2007, at L6. 
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for reform-minded legislators and groups such as Common Cause, 
whose New Jersey chapter made it one of their signature issues.76
B. The Current Law on the Restriction of Campaign Contributions 
The seemingly insidious direct corporate campaign contribu-
tions under review in New Jersey have been completely outlawed for 
federal candidates for some time.77  The Tillman Act of 1907 was the 
first attempt by Congress to enact a ban on direct corporate contribu-
tions.78  However, the effectiveness of the Tillman Act was short-lived.  
“In time, of course, corporations would find other ways to translate 
their treasury funds into political influence, such as increased reli-
ance on lobbying, company-funded political advertisements, covert 
reimbursement of executive or employee contributions, and soft 
money gifts to political parties.”79
By 1971, “corporate leaders pushed Congress to add provisions 
to the Federal Election Campaigns Act (FECA) clearly codifying their 
ability to form voluntarily funded political committees.”80  “Formed 
by corporations to collect voluntary contributions from their mem-
bers, [Political Action Committees] may lawfully contribute to elec-
toral candidates.”81  Over time, Political Action Committee (PAC) 
donations to individual federal candidates were seemingly not a pow-
erful enough vehicle for business corporations seeking to influence 
the electoral process.  Business corporations began circumventing the 
system by making large contributions to the national political parties, 
which in turn could work on voter turnout, registration, and issue ad-
vertisements.82  In 2002, Congress again sought to curtail the influ-
 76 See Common Cause, http://www.commoncause.org/newjersey (last visited Feb. 
20, 2008). 
 77 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000) (Supp. II 2003) (“It is unlawful for any . . . corpora-
tion . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to 
any political office . . . .”); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 
152–53 (2003) (upholding a ban on corporate contributions as a valid rationale for 
preventing corruption). 
 78 Publicity of Political Contributions Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907), amended 
by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006)). 
 79 Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign 
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 926 (2004). 
 80 Id. at 933. 
 81 Id. at 928 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b (Supp. II 2003)). 
 82 Winkler, supra note 79 at 935–36 (“In coordination with their candidates, the 
parties used soft money to pay for expensive advertisements during election cam-
paigns.  Soft money became a mechanism for corporations and unions to skirt the 
contribution ban and donate general treasury funds for what was ultimately cam-
paign spending.”). 
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ence of corporate money in federal elections, and passed the Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).83  The BCRA banned the dona-
tions of so-called “soft money,”84  in essence ending the practice of 
unlimited direct corporate contributions to the national parties.85  
BCRA’s limitation on corporate soft money contributions was upheld 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in McConnell v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission.86  The Court’s decision in McConnell reflected the 
continuing rationale evolving from Buckley v. Valeo87  and its progeny: 
that limitations on contributions, while subject to strict scrutiny, were 
likely to be found constitutional, while limitations on campaign ex-
penditures were unlikely to pass strict scrutiny.88
Of course, congressional actions and Supreme Court decisions 
had no effect on candidates for state and local office in New Jersey, 
who continued to solicit and receive direct contributions to their 
election campaigns from corporate entities.89  New Jersey is by no 
means an anomaly.  In fact, roughly half of the states still allow some 
direct corporate campaign contributions.90  Only following a series of 
political scandals and public outcry against perceived corruption did 
New Jersey begin to pass laws that began to further limit corporate 
 83 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431–56 (2006)). 
 84 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006) (providing the Federal Election Commission’s definition 
of a legal campaign contribution). 
 85 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 133 (2003).  See also Winkler, 
supra note 79, at 936 (“The BCRA simply barred corporations and unions from using 
general treasury funds to make contributions to political parties.  Once again, corpo-
rations and unions can still undertake the regulated activity—giving to parties—but 
they must do so through the agency costs-reducing device of PACs.”). 
 86 Id. at 134. 
 87 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 88 Id. at 14.  “[C]ontribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of 
the most fundamental First Amendment activities.”  Id.  “A restriction on the amount 
of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a cam-
paign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of is-
sues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”  
Id. at 19.  “By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures . . . a limitation upon . . . 
[contributions] entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to 
engage in free communication.”  Id. at 20. 
 89 See New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC), 
http://www.elec.state.nj.us (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).  Campaign disclosure reports 
for state candidates confirm that state level candidates in New Jersey continued to 
accept corporate donations that would be illegal for federal candidates.  Id.  See also 
Joe Donahue, Kean Accepted Contributions From Firms He Sought to Ban, STAR LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Oct. 7, 2006, at 1. 
 90 Public Affairs Council, States That Prohibit Corporate Contributions, 
http://www.pac.org/page/ethics/StatesthatProhibitCorporateContributions.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2008). 
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contributions, albeit only for those businesses holding or seeking 
government contracts.91
The constitutional legitimacy of subjecting businesses to strin-
gent contribution regulations has been repeatedly upheld.  In FEC v. 
National Right to Work Committee,92 the Court upheld a federal law re-
stricting the ability of corporations to raise funds for candidates from 
non-members of the corporation.  The Court unanimously found 
that the government’s compelling interest in regulating corporate 
donations outweighed the free association rights of the contributors, 
holding “that substantial aggregations of [corporate] wealth” should 
“not be converted into political ‘war chests’ which could be used to 
incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the contribu-
tions.”93
However, just several years later in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life, Inc., the Court held, by a 5-4 margin, that the segregated funds 
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to an anti-abortion ad-
vocacy group formed as a nonprofit corporation.94  As the group’s 
stated purpose was to influence policy and engage in issue advocacy, 
and not to make profits, there was not the same level of danger of 
corruption as there was with for-profit businesses.95
But nonprofits may generally still be subjected to campaign fi-
nance regulation, as was held in FEC v. Beaumont, 96 where the Court 
reiterated that it will not “second-guess a legislative determination as 
to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil 
feared.”97  In FEC v. Beaumont, the Court distinguished FEC v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. by noting that although the Court will “as-
sume advocacy corporations are generally different from traditional 
business corporations in the improbability that contributions they 
might make would end up supporting causes that some of their 
members would not approve” there still exists a legitimate concern 
that nonprofits can corrupt the electoral process.98  Nonprofits, like 
 91 See Richard J. Codey, Acting New Jersey Governor, State of the State Address 
(Jan. 11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/ 
speech?contentId=16583). 
 92 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
 93 Id. at 207. 
 94 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 
(1986). 
 95 Id. at 259–60. 
 96 539 U.S. 146, 152–53 (2003). 
 97 Id. at 157 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 
U.S. 197, 210 (1982)). 
 98 Id. at 159. 
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“their for-profit counterparts, benefit from significant state-created 
advantages, and may well be able to amass substantial political war 
chests”; thus, the need for regulating their contributions remains.99
Thus, the Supreme Court has continuously reaffirmed its juris-
prudence that corporate political speech may be subjected to strin-
gent limitations, as corporations possess a unique ability to amass 
great amounts of wealth, which could easily corrupt the electoral 
process.100  It is important to note, however, that while the federal 
government treats a business’s PAC as an independent and distinct 
entity from the corporation, New Jersey does not for the purposes of 
its pay-to-play ban.101  New Jersey’s definition of a “business entity” in-
cludes “any subsidiaries directly or indirectly controlled by the busi-
ness entity” and “any political organization organized under [S]ection 
527 of the Internal Revenue Code that is directly or indirectly controlled 
by the business entity . . . .”102Thus, as New Jersey’s version of a PAC, 
known as a Continuing Political Committee (CPC), is incorporated 
under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, a business’s direct 
contributions and its contributions from a CPC under its control 
would both count towards the contribution limit for such a busi-
ness.103
New Jersey would likely be within constitutional bounds to com-
pletely ban all corporate contributions to state candidates, as Con-
gress has already done so for federal candidates, a decision that has 
been repeatedly upheld by the courts.104  While a federal constitu-
tional challenge to New Jersey’s recent legislation is possible in the 
 99 Id. at 160 (internal quotations omitted).  The Court held that applying the 
prohibition on corporate donations to non-profit corporations was consistent with 
the First Amendment, but that non-profit corporations, like all corporations, could 
create a PAC that “may be wholly controlled by the sponsoring corporation, whose 
employees and stockholders or members generally may be solicited for contribu-
tions.”  Id. at 149. 
 100 James Weinstein, Contributions: Campaign Finance Reform and The First Amend-
ment: An Introduction, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1062–65 (2002). 
 101 New Jersey’s version of a PAC is known as a Continuing Political Committee 
(CPC).  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-3n (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 102 Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (Sept. 22, 2004) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm. 
 103 Steven Sholk, A Guide to New Jersey Corporate Political Action Committees After the 
2004 Campaign Finance Legislation and Executive Order, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 11, 36 
(2004).  “[I]f the corporation or an interest holder contributes to the corporation’s 
CPC, and the CPC then contributes to a candidate or committee, ELEC [Election 
Law Enforcement Commission] may take the position that as a matter of economic 
substance, the corporation or interest holder made the contribution to the candidate 
or committee.”  Id. at 31. 
 104 See e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
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near future,105 such a challenge is likely to fail, based on the courts 
repeated determinations that it will not second guess legislative de-
terminations that a prophylactic remedy is necessary to deter corrup-
tion.106  Should it be shown that limiting contributions from CPCs was 
narrowly tailored to the State’s interest in stopping corruption and 
the appearance of corruption in the contract procurement process, 
New Jersey’s law would survive a federal constitutional challenge.  
Federal courts have previously granted the legislature the discretion 
to determine how to uphold the integrity of its political process,107 
and if the New Jersey Legislature should determine that it is necessary 
to limit CPC contributions to protect the integrity of New Jersey’s po-
litical process, then such a limitation would likely be upheld by a fed-
eral court. 
Moreover, New Jersey, with its history of corruption and the on-
going appearance of corruption, would likely be within constitutional 
bounds if it chose to drastically limit all campaign contributions.  In 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,108 the Court reviewed a Mis-
souri legislative scheme that imposed contribution limits ranging 
from $250 to $1000 depending on the office and size of the constitu-
ency.109  The Nixon court defined what evidentiary obligation was 
needed to be proven by the government for the regulations to pass 
this level of scrutiny.  In Montana Right to Life Association v. Eddle-
man,110 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suc-
cinctly interpreted the required evidentiary standard of Nixon as thus: 
state campaign contribution limits will be upheld if (1) there is 
adequate evidence that the limitation furthers a sufficiently im-
portant state interest, and (2) if the limits are “closely drawn”—
i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on the state’s interest, (b) leave the 
contributor free to affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the 
candidate to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective cam-
paign.111
In Nixon, the Supreme Court found Missouri’s contribution limits 
were allowable because the government had met its evidentiary obli-
gation, and there was no showing from the challengers that the con-
tribution limits would dramatically affect the funding of political 
 105 Charles Stile, Ferriero Support of Pay-to-Play Stuns Democrats, BERGEN RECORD, Aug. 
30, 2007, at A1. 
 106 Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 157. 
 107 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003). 
 108 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 109 Id. at 382. 
 110 345 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 111 Id. at 1092. 
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campaigns or otherwise prevent the running of effective cam-
paigns.112
In the recent decision of Randall v. Sorrell,113 however, the Su-
preme Court found Vermont’s contribution limits were severely low, 
and, therefore, were not narrowly tailored.114  Vermont’s scheme had 
mandated contribution limits as low as $400 for governor and other 
statewide offices.115  The Court found these limits would hamper the 
ability to carry out effective campaigns,116 and thus laid out a more 
exacting standard of how to narrowly tailor contribution limits.117  
Importantly, one such rationale was for “special justification.”118  In 
Vermont, there was no problem with corruption.119  However, in New 
Jersey, where candidates for office have accepted bribes as low as 
$500,120 a court may be more willing to allow more stringent cam-
paign finance limits, should such “special justification” evidence be 
put forward regarding New Jersey’s historical and ongoing problem 
of corruption. 
C. The First Challenge to the Pay-to-Play Law: State Constitutional 
Grounds 
In 2008 the new pay-to-play law was challenged in state court on 
First Amendment grounds.121  A New Jersey appellate court upheld 
the law over a challenge from a public contractor excluded from ob-
taining future contracts by the New Jersey Department of Transporta-
tion because of their political donations.122  Analyzing the New Jersey 
law under the State Constitution’s free speech clause, in a way no 
more restrictive than the Federal Constitution,123 the court did not 
employ a level of strict scrutiny equaling a presumption against con-
stitutionality.124  As the court noted, the correct level of scrutiny, un-
 112 528 U.S. at 397. 
 113 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
 114 Id. at 253. 
 115 Id. at 237. 
 116 Id. at 253. 
 117 Id. at 247–48. 
 118 Id. at 261. 
 119 Randall, 528 U.S. at 261. 
 120 Smothers, supra note 26, at A1. 
 121 In re Earle Asphalt Company, 950 A.2d 918 (App. Div. June 30, 2008). 
 122 Id. at 921. 
 123 Id. at 922, n.1 (citing Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 264 
(1998)). 
 124 Id. at 923 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 
(2003)). 
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der both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions, is that “a statute 
limiting political contributions will be sustained ‘if the State demon-
strates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely 
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational free-
doms.’”125
While the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the 
constitutionality of legislation that “imposes targeted limitations upon 
political contributions by a class of contributors considered to pose a 
particularly serious threat” to preventing corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption, a New Jersey court has addressed such a statute.126  
In 1989, a New Jersey appellate court in the case of In re Petition of 
Soto, upheld a portion of the Casino Control Act prohibiting political 
donations by officers and employees of casinos.  The court found a 
high risk of vulnerability to corruption in this tightly regulated indus-
try, justifying a compelling government interest in maintaining integ-
rity.127  Thus, in response to the challenge to the pay-to-play law, the 
court in In re Earle Asphalt found a similar “strong governmental in-
terest in limiting political contributions by businesses that contract 
with the State . . . .”128  The remaining question was whether the limi-
tations were “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of asso-
ciational freedoms.”129  Again referring back to Buckley, the court 
found that the limitations of the new law were closely drawn, given 
that the State’s “interest in safeguarding against the appearance of 
impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the 
process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated.”130
IV. CORRUPTION AND THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION CONTINUE 
UNDER THE NEW STATUTE 
There are several problems and loopholes in the current statu-
tory scheme, once called among the strongest in the nation.131  As Jus-
tice O’Connor noted, “[m]oney, like water, will always find an out-
let.”132  This section will examine some of these outlets and explore 
 125 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)). 
 126 In re Earle Asphalt, 953 A.2d at 923 (citing In re Petition of Soto, 236 N.J. Su-
per. 303 (App. Div. 1989)). 
 127 In re Petition of Soto, 236 N.J. Super. 303, 321 (App. Div. 1989). 
 128 In re Earle Asphalt, 953 A.2d at 923. 
 129 Id. at 925 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). 
 130 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30). 
 131 Press Release, Acting Governor Richard Codey, Codey Signs Pay-to-Play Ban 
Into Law (Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/governor/ 
njnewsline/view_article.pl?id=2427. 
 132 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003). 
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how money from state and local contractors continues to flow to pub-
lic officials and political candidates. 
A. The Fair-and-Open Contract Standard 
Perhaps the most glaring shortcoming is that the same campaign 
contributors that the legislation sought to preclude from obtaining 
no-bid contracts can still contribute and then obtain government 
contracts that go through a “fair and open” bidding process.133  Fur-
thermore, once a contract has gone through such a “fair and open” 
bidding process, the public entity is under no obligation to grant it to 
the lowest bidder—the entity can choose whichever bidder it de-
sires.134  Per state law, a “fair and open” bidding process means 
at a minimum, that the contract is (1) advertised in newspapers or 
on the public entity’s website to give sufficient prior notice of the 
contract; (2) awarded pursuant to public solicitation of proposals 
or qualifications under criteria disclosed in writing prior to the so-
licitation; and (3) the proposals or qualifications are publicly 
opened and announced when the contract is awarded.  The pub-
lic entity’s decision as to what is a fair and open process is final.  
There is no requirement to award the contract to the lowest re-
sponsible bidder.135
The above requirements that transform an illegal no-bid contract 
into a legal contract are not particularly stringent.  Thus, elected offi-
cials can advertise a public contract, receive several bids, and con-
tinue to award the contract to the friendly company that has show-
ered them with campaign contributions, even though another 
company’s bid was higher.  Under the state rules, this would be per-
fectly legal and allowable.136
 133 Sholk, supra note 103, at 21–22. 
 134 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12(g) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007). 
 135 Sholk, supra note 103, at 21–22. 
 136 Id. at 22 n.62.  Assemblyman Michael Patrick Carroll, criticized the exception 
for contracts awarded pursuant to a fair and open process, saying “[t]he bill also ef-
fectively allows a public entity to exempt itself from pay-to-play reform by declaring 
itself to have a ‘fair and open’ process for the awarding of contracts, and that decla-
ration is considered final under the terms of the bill.”  Id.  However, “the entity’s 
contracting process need not require the selection of the lowest bidding responsible 
bidder in order to be declared ‘fair and open.’ The bill also fails to address the po-
tential influence of a political contribution on decisions regarding contracts already 
awarded . . . which can have lucrative implications for contractors.”  Id. (quoting Mi-
nority Statement to Assembly Bill A2, Assemblyman Michael Patrick Carroll, Assem-
bly State Government Committee, 2004). 
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B. The Continuing Problem of Pay-to-Play at the Local and County 
Level 
Another gap in the statutory scheme is that the current legisla-
tion applies only to the state, and not to local and county level gov-
ernments.  This loophole is (somewhat ironically) discussed on the 
website of the State Division of Local Government Services.137  De-
signed to help local government officials navigate the complex and 
unfamiliar framework of the pay-to-play legislation, one “Frequently 
Asked Question” posited the following: 
A contractor said that he made a contribution to a political action 
committee (PAC) within our county, but they have not made any 
direct contributions to the local officials in office. The county 
PAC supports a political party that is represented within our gov-
erning body. Is that contractor eligible for a non-fair and open 
contract? 
     Yes.  If the contractor has made contributions to a county PAC 
they are not precluded from doing non-fair and open business 
with a municipality in that county.138
This acknowledges that a contractor could donate large sums of 
money to the county political party, which could in turn support the 
local candidates, and the donator could still receive a no-bid contract 
from the municipality, thereby finding a new outlet for its contribu-
tions (and circumventing the campaign finance laws, as may be the 
case).  As was directly mentioned in the preamble of McGreevey’s Ex-
ecutive Order, it is often the “county political party committees . . . 
[who] exert significant influence over the . . . election process.”139  
These county-level leaders have the private influence and political 
power to steer municipal contracts to friendly businesses.140  More-
over, public contracts at the local and county level  can be just as lu-
crative as state level contracts: 
Public contracts can be extremely lucrative. According to the 
Gannett newspapers, about one third of all State contracts issued 
 137 See New Jersey Division of Local Services, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.nj.gov/dca/lgs/p2p/refs/p2pfaq.pdf at Question 10 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2008). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm. 
 140 Eileen Smith & Eric Schwartz, Norcross, Bank Enjoy Marriage of Convenience, 
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 27, 2004, at A1.  Camden County De-
mocratic leader and Commerce Bank executive George Norcross wields influence on 
the municipal level as well, and “approximately 15 percent to 20 percent of [Com-
merce Bank’s Insurance] business is from negotiated, or no-bid, contracts with mu-
nicipalities.”  Id. 
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in 2003 were unadvertised, worth a staggering total of $414 mil-
lion.  That sum does not include the millions more awarded at 
the county and municipal levels.  In that same year, the combined 
sum of $91 million was raised in contributions to political com-
mittees for legislative and county elections and contributions to 
municipal elections. 141
Though there are no definitive numbers available, given the size of 
the budgets of New Jersey’s 566 municipalities and twenty-one county 
governments142 (not to mention school districts, fire districts, etc.), it 
is a reasonable inference that no-bid pay-to-play contracts at the 
county and municipal level represent a greater portion of the total 
pay-to-play system than do contracts at the state level, where regula-
tion is more stringent.143
C. Contributions from Employees and Partners 
Another loophole is that while the new pay-to-play statutes ban 
businesses from making donations and receiving contracts, employ-
ees of the business can make personal donations.144  For many smaller 
companies this is not applicable,145 but for certain entities, most no-
tably law firms, it can be a large loophole.  The legislation defines a 
“business entity” to include “all principals who own or control more 
than 10 percent of the profits or assets of a business entity or 10 per-
cent of the stock in the case of a business entity that is a corporation 
for profit.”146  This definition allows, for example, the partners of a 
law firm (should they own less than ten percent) to make donations 
 141 Franzese & O’Hern, supra note 6, at 1222. 
 142 New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, Division of Local Government 
Services, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/lgs (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (providing 
budget data for New Jersey’s counties and municipalities). 
 143 Joe Donahue & Dunstan McNichol, Reports Tracking Pay-to-Play Online: ELEC 
Data Show Firms That Donated Over $11.6M Won $5.2B in Fees, STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 11, 
2007, at 13 (noting that several firms with large state government contracts, while not 
donating to state political parties, gave substantial amounts to local and county po-
litical parties). 
 144 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.15 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).  As long as an 
employee does not own more than ten percent of a business, an employee can make 
personal donations and not jeopardize the company’s eligibility for a public contract.  
Id. § 19:44A-20.17. 
 145 See id. § 19:44A-20.17.  The statute defines business entity and would include 
contributions from a sole-proprietorship as applicable to the person, rather than the 
business entity.  Id.  Arguably, this is unfair to larger businesses, as sole proprietor-
ships would not be barred from receiving public contracts because their donation 
was not attributable to the business. 
 146 Id. § 19:44A-20.17(i). 
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to a candidate,147 and their firm can still receive no-bid public con-
tracts.148  It should also be noted that in many counties, the county 
party directly funded the campaigns of the county-wide officials.149  
However, since the new laws went into effect, some elected county of-
ficials (who in past campaigns never created personal candidate ac-
counts or raised money on their own) began raising money for indi-
vidual candidate accounts.150  By each candidate creating a separate 
and distinct account, each candidate could individually raise the 
maximum amount,151 and a firm seeking to influence a slate of 
elected officials could contribute a greater aggregate amount than 
would be allowable if it donated just to the county committee, as it 
had done in the pre-legislation years. 
D. Donations to the State Party’s Federal Account are Exempt 
According to news reports, shortly after Governor Codey signed 
the new pay-to-play legislation into law, Democratic Party officials be-
gan planning how to circumvent the new contribution limits.152  
 147 Diane C. Walsh, Contractor Funds Circle Back to Democrats, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 17, 
2006, at 45.  For instance, since the new law went into effect: 
[A] Woodbridge-based law firm that has been among the biggest con-
tributors to the [Democratic] party, stopped donating.  Between 1998 
and 2004, the firm and its employees donated $390,000 to the [Middle-
sex] county Democrats.  But in 2005, the firm did not make a single 
donation, although its employees gave nearly $59,000 to the party and 
an additional $30,000 to the individual accounts of county officials. . . . 
[T]he managing partner . . . said individual lawyers can and have con-
tinued to donate without violating the pay-to-play ordinance because 
no one owns 10 percent of the firm. 
Id. 
 148 See New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC), 
http://www.elec.state.nj.us/PublicInformation/viewreports.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 
2008).  An extremely rudimentary search can be done via the state’s election website 
by putting in the name of the law firm in the “Employer Name” field.  The results 
return the names of individual lawyers at these firms and the various (and numer-
ous) donations that they have made. 
 149 See e.g., D’Ambrosio, supra note 68, at A1. 
 150 Walsh, supra note 147, at 45. 
 151 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:44A-11.3 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (contribution 
limits for individual candidates), with N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:44A-11.4 (West 1999 & 
Supp. 2007) (contribution limits for various committees).  See also New Jersey Elec-
tion Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC), http://www.elec.state.nj.us/ 
forcandidates/elect_limits.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) (a user-friendly chart pro-
viding the current contribution limits for each type of source). 
 152 Josh Margolin & Jeff Whelan, ‘Pay-Play’ Ban Offers Democrats a Loophole—Party 
Lawyer Outlines a New Route for Cash, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 24, 2005, at 1; see also Sandy 
McClure, Memo to Donors Has GOP Riled Up Critics: It Dodges Pay-to-Play Ban, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Mar. 25, 2005, at A1 (explaining the purpose of the 
memo). 
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These news reports detailed that party lawyers drafted a memo to 
party fund-raisers detailing how a state contractor could continue to 
contribute without triggering the new pay-to-play limits.153  The 
document was distributed “just hours after Codey signed the pay-to-
play law.”154  The memo advised contributors that they could “con-
tribute up to $10,000 per year to the Democratic State Committee’s 
federal campaign committee” without violating the statute.155
The memo explained that the state party maintains a federal 
campaign account for aiding presidential and congressional cam-
paigns in New Jersey.156  This account, and donations to it, are regu-
lated under federal election laws and policed by the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC).157  Thus, the New Jersey’s Election Law Enforce-
ment Commission (ELEC), and the new pay-to-play statute have no 
authority over this account and cannot bar donations to it to by state 
contractors.158
The Republican state party chairman disagreed with the inter-
pretation offered by the Democratic lawyers, saying that the Republi-
can party would not accept donations from state contractors to their 
federal account, and that a Democratic attempt to do so “wouldn’t be 
a loophole, it would be a glaring, giant, gaping, intentional violation 
of the spirit of the law.”159  Several days after news of this memo 
leaked to media outlets, the Democrats retreated from their position 
and pledged not to make use of the federal account for purposes of 
evading the pay-to-play laws,160 but it remains an open question as to 
how enforcement agencies such as the FEC and ELEC (and the 
courts, for that matter) would have treated this type of contribution. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 
Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 431–56 (2000)).  The Federal Election 
Commission has authority over candidates for federal office (House of Representa-
tives, U.S. Senate, and President).  Id. 
 158 2 U.S.C. § 453 (2000).  State campaign laws regarding election to a federal of-
fice are preempted by the federal campaign laws.  See Id. 
 159 Margolin & Whelan, supra note 152, at 1. 
 160 Tom Moran, Democrats Back Out of a Loophole for Donors, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 30, 
2005, at 13. 
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E. Legislators Can Solicit Contributions from State Contractors 
It is critical to remember that some of the most costly and closely 
contested races in New Jersey are for the legislature.161  However, the 
state pay-to-play ban covers only the election accounts of the gover-
nor and the state parties.162  Individual legislators have their own 
campaign accounts and can still accept donations from businesses 
with state contracts.163  Many of these legislators are very powerful, 
both in their home districts and in Trenton.164  Thus, a contractor 
wishing to exert some political influence on those granting the con-
tract could donate substantial sums to influential legislators, who may 
in turn lobby and push the state government to send the contract to 
their favored contributor.165
This is not to suggest that a quid pro quo exists in such a situa-
tion, as legislators do not control which bidder receives a contract; a 
true quid pro quo is legislatively impossible.166  However, legislators 
have a unique ability to exert influence on state agencies and authori-
ties through their budgetary oversight, votes on nominations, and 
routine hearings into their activities.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
suggest that a contractor seeking to procure state business would 
make a powerful ally by donating substantial sums to legislators. 
F. The Problem of Wheeling 
Some state laws have been proposed to ban the practice known 
as “wheeling,” where campaign dollars are swapped among county 
political parties, legislative leadership committees, and state commit-
tees to candidates for local office, purportedly to evade current con-
 161 Donahue, supra note 29, at A1 (noting that spending for the 2007 legislative 
races reached a record $69 million). 
 162 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 163 Id. § 19:44A-20.14.  The pay-to-play ban only covers contributions to “any can-
didate or holder of the public office of Governor, or to any State or county political 
party committee . . . .”  Id. 
 164 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 44, at B1. 
 165 See Jones, supra note 44, at B1.  Some legislators exert significant influence in 
county organizations and municipalities around the state, including State Senator 
Raymond Lesniak (D-Elizabeth) who controls the Union County Democrats.  Id.  
Also note that several members of the Legislature are Mayors of municipalities or 
Freeholders in county governments and control contracts granted by those respec-
tive governments.  See New Jersey Legislative Roster, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ 
members/roster.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). 
 166 The Executive branch, specifically the Division of Purchase and Property in the 
Department of the Treasury, is the State’s central procurement agency.  N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 52:18A-3 (year).  See also State of New Jersey, the Department of the Treasury, 
Division of Purchase and Property, http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/purchase/ (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2008). 
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tribution limits.167  It is often the county political leaders who exert 
tremendous amounts of influence,168 and donations to the county 
party continue the practice of pay-to-play with little to stop them. 
This process is often a thinly veiled effort to skirt the contribu-
tion limits by using a different campaign committee as a middle-man.  
There is a modest anti-wheeling provision, enacted by Governor 
McGreevey,169 explained on the ELEC website, “[f]rom January 1st 
through June 30th of each year, a county political party committee is 
prohibited from making a contribution to another county political 
party committee and a county political party committee is prohibited 
from accepting a contribution from another county political party 
committee.”170
This is an extremely weak provision because it allows the transfer 
of funds between county committees up to $37,000 in the crucial 
time right before the election, after June 30 but before November.171  
The transfer of cash in itself is not illegal, and, according to the 
ELEC, some sort of deal or agreement must be proven.172  In a back-
room political culture where many of the so-called bosses have per-
sonal and professional ties,173 there often appears to be an under-
standing that campaign dollars will flow to the crucial races in a 
timely fashion.174
There are many ways a business entity seeking to curry favor with 
elected officials can make donations, beyond the purview of the legis-
 167 Franzese & O’Hern, supra note 6, at 1223. 
 168 See Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm (discussing the influence of 
county political powers). 
 169 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.3a (West 1999 & Supp. 2007); see also New Jersey 
Election Law Enforcement Commission, http://www.elec.state.nj.us/forcandidates/ 
elect_limits.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) (noting the limitations on county parties’ 
donations to each other from January 1 through June 30 of each year). 
 170 New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, supra note 169. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Lilo H. Stainton, ‘Wheeling’ Decried in ‘04 Ocean Campaign Hudson Donation 
Matched Same Day, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Apr. 3, 2005, at A17 (quot-
ing Frederick Hermann, executive director of the Election Law Enforcement Com-
mission, saying, “[g]enerally speaking, you have to prove that there was some sort of 
deal or agreement that this was going to happen. Just the fact that somebody made a 
contribution on one day and they gave it to someone else the same day doesn’t make 
it illegal. It’s a question of: Can you prove it?”). 
 173 Smith & Schwartz, supra note 140 (noting that Camden County Democratic 
leader and Commerce Bank executive George Norcross wields considerable influ-
ence throughout New Jersey, and Middlesex County Democratic leader John Lynch 
formerly sat on the Board of Commerce Bank with Norcross). 
 174 James W. Prado Roberts, Flow of Cash Creates Power, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury 
Park, N.J.), Oct. 26, 2004, at A1. 
WEBER (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:40:47 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1467 
 
lation, which would then be wheeled to the intended recipient.  Per-
haps most importantly, on the state level there are, by statutory crea-
tion,175 entities known as legislative leadership committees: 
The President of the Senate, the Minority Leader of the Senate, 
the Speaker of the General Assembly and the Minority Leader of 
the General Assembly may each establish, authorize the estab-
lishment of, or designate one legislative leadership committee for 
the purpose of receiving contributions and making expenditures 
to aid or promote the candidacy of any individual, or the candi-
dacy of individuals, for elective office in any election or the pas-
sage or defeat of a public question or public questions in any elec-
tion.176
These committees can receive up to $25,000 in a year from a 
business entity.177  In turn, these so-called legislative leadership com-
mittees can donate or wheel unlimited sums to state, county, munici-
pal, and individual campaign accounts.178  Therefore, legislative lead-
ership committees make a perfect host for transferring such 
money.179
H. Redevelopment Pay-to-Play 
There is also a new and emerging problem in the field of pay-to-
play, noted by the New Jersey chapter of Common Cause to be one of 
the most important issues currently facing the quality of life and pub-
lic trust in New Jersey.180  New Jersey is currently undergoing major 
real estate development in urban areas.181  In many such areas the city 
 175 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-10.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. § 19:44A-11.4 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 178 Id.; see also New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, supra note 148 
(showing all the contribution limits and noting the special nature of the legislative 
leadership committees); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:25-11.2 (2008) (showing no limits on 
contributions received by Legislative Leadership Committees).  While the state 
committees can also transfer unlimited amounts of cash amongst each other, busi-
ness entities cannot donate to state committees without triggering the pay-to-play 
laws.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.14 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 179 See Cynthia Burton, Big Money Coming from Party Bigwigs, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, Nov. 1, 2007, at B1. 
 180 See Common Cause New Jersey, www.commoncause.org/newjersey (follow 
“Redevelopment Pay-to-Play Reform” hyperlink under “Our Issues”).  “Redevelop-
ment decisions have profound impacts on the quality of life of our citizens and it is 
critical that they be made based on the public interest, not as a reward to big con-
tributors and politically connected players.”  Id. 
 181 See, e.g., Antoinette Martin, Can a Face Lift Offer a New Identity?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
29, 2006, Real Estate, at 11, (noting that, for instance, there is promising ongoing 
redevelopment in Rahway, New Jersey, where eminent domain, condemnation by the 
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has created redevelopment zones and controls the development 
rights to abandoned or dilapidated properties.182  Developers com-
pete heavily for the redevelopment rights to these areas, which are 
controlled and granted by the municipality or county, along with 
generous “loans, grants, tax breaks or the use of public condemna-
tion powers.”183
These redevelopment agreements would not fall under the pay-
to-play provisions, which cover only “services or furnishing of any ma-
terial, supplies or equipment or for the acquisition, sale, or lease of 
any land or building.”184  In these new redevelopment situations, the 
builder is not purchasing land from the state.  Therefore, they are 
not barred from making donations.  As has been discussed, this stat-
ute applies only to the state and its many authorities, and not to 
counties and municipalities.185  Furthermore, it is often engineering 
firms, consultants, and attorneys, working on behalf of (or in collu-
sion with) developers, who make donations to those who control the 
development rights.186
V. PROPOSED MODELS FOR REFORM 
A. Proposed Bills in New Jersey 
In response to criticisms that New Jersey’s initial reforms of the 
campaign finance system did not go far enough, there have been sev-
eral bills proposed in the legislature to reform the system.  From the 
previous section discussing the shortcomings of the current state sys-
tem, it is clear that reform is needed. 
The most obvious reform would be a total ban on direct corpo-
rate donations and donations from their Continuing Political Com-
mittees.187  There does not seem to be much public impetus for such 
redevelopment agency, and private development are transforming the economy of a 
city). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Joe Donohue, Pay-to-Play Limitations Take Shape in Trenton, STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 
24, 2006, at 16. 
 184 N.J. STAT.  ANN. § 19:44A-20.15 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 185 See supra Part III.B. 
 186 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.14 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).  A law firm or engi-
neering firm could donate as much as it wanted to a state agency or authority, and 
since the public contract would be going to the developer itself and not to the law-
yers or engineers, the pay-to-play statutes would not be triggered because the law 
firm or engineering firm would not fall under the definition of an ineligible con-
tributor.  Id. 
 187 See, e.g., A398, 213th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2007). 
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a ban in New Jersey, though roughly half the states have completely 
banned direct corporate contributions.188  Short of a total ban on all 
corporate contributions, there is an impetus to tighten the rules on 
those businesses seeking and holding government contracts.  Many 
have called for an outright statewide ban on pay-to-play applicable at 
all levels of government by the legislature.189  However, with New Jer-
sey’s strong history of “home rule,”190 it is not clear that the legislature 
and governor will seek to promulgate the entire spectrum of cam-
paign finance and contract procurement as a purely state-level issue, 
as doing so would be politically risky in a state where local leaders are 
extremely influential statewide. 
Such legislation would certainly be constitutional, as there is a 
compelling state government interest in curbing the appearance of 
corruption at all levels of government, and it has been shown that all 
levels of government (state, county, local) are intertwined and inter-
dependent in New Jersey’s campaign finance system.191  If proposed 
legislation regulating campaign contributions could merely describe 
and detail a “sufficient linkage between the award of state contracts 
and contributions to county committees, a court is likely to find that 
the limitation is closely drawn to match the sufficiently important 
government interest of upholding the integrity of the state contract-
ing process.”192  Thus, it would not be unconstitutional for the state to 
enact a uniform pay-to-play ban on all levels of government, whereby 
a prospective contractor’s donations to any candidate or committee at 
any level of government would bar that business from receiving a no-
bid contract from all levels of government. 
However, in the event that the legislature and the governor will 
not enact pay-to-play legislation regulating all levels of government, 
there are a number of actions that could be taken to eliminate the 
gaps in the current statutory framework, and expand the scope of the 
current law.  For instance, an Assembly Bill says that a business that 
“has made a campaign contribution would be prohibited for one year 
from performing a contract for a public entity at any level of govern-
ment until one year after the contribution is made.”193  And as a pen-
alty, a business that “willfully and knowingly violates the bill’s provi-
 188 Public Affairs Council, supra note 90. 
 189 See supra Part III.B. 
 190 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (8th ed. 2004).  “A state legislative provision or 
action allocating a measure of autonomy to a local government, conditional on its 
acceptance of certain terms.”  Id. 
 191 See supra Parts III.B and III.G. 
 192 Sholk, supra note 103, at 40. 
 193 A691, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006) (emphasis added). 
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sions would be subject to a penalty of up to twice the value of its con-
tract and debarment from public contracting for up to five years.”194
Another proposed bill would bar any business entity making a 
campaign contribution from performing any government contract in 
excess of $17,500 for one year.195  This bill essentially recognizes that 
under New Jersey’s pay-to-play and contract procurement laws, a 
business making donations is barred only from no-bid contracts but 
can currently still receive contracts that have been put out to bid.196  
Furthermore, since the awarding agencies have wide latitude,197 pay-
to-play is ongoing.  This bill would bar donating businesses from re-
ceiving contracts that have been advertised and competitively bid, 
supplementing the current legislation that applies only to no-bid con-
tracts. 
Governor Corzine has publicly said that he wants to close the so-
called ten percent loophole, where partners in law firms and other 
businesses are free to give as much as is allowable, so long as they own 
less than ten percent of the business which is bidding on a state con-
tract.198  This would be a substantial reform, as some partnerships 
(law firms, specifically) are among the biggest participants in the pay-
to-play system.199  Currently, bill A1488 in the Assembly would change 
the definition of “business entity” to include “all principals who own 
two percent or more of the equity in the corporation or business  
trust . . . .”200  This bill would have a drastic effect on the ability of the 
partners in some of New Jersey’s larger law firms to make donations 
to their favored candidate, as doing so would bar their firms from re-
ceiving no-bid state contracts. 
During the 2005 gubernatorial campaign, candidate Corzine 
pledged to end the practice of “wheeling.”201  As of yet, this has not 
been accomplished.  However, some members of the legislature have 
drafted bills to end the practice and tighten current regulations.  
One proposed Assembly Bill “provides that no county committee of a 
political party may make a contribution of money or other thing of 
 194 Id. 
 195 A528, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 196 See supra Part III.A. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Joe Donahue, Pay-to-Play Ban Working . . . Some Say Too Well: Analysis Shows Many 
Once-Generous Firms Have Cut Back on Donations in N.J., STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
June 11, 2006, at 1. 
 199 See supra Part III.C. 
 200 A1488, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 201 Editorial, Slow Road to Reform; Towns, Counties Get OK to End Pay-to-Play, BERGEN 
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Dec. 12, 2005, at L6. 
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value to any other such committee, nor may any such committee ac-
cept a contribution from a county committee of a political party.”202  
Essentially, this bill would take the current ban on transferring 
money from January 1 through June 30,203 and extend it throughout 
the entire year.  A violation would be a crime of the third degree, car-
rying a penalty of three to five years in prison and a fine of up to 
$15,000.204  There is also a proposal that would bar county commit-
tees, other than the home county of a candidate, from making dona-
tions greater than $7200, rather than the $37,000 which is currently 
allowable.205
Additional bills are pending in the legislature that go much fur-
ther to reign in the influence of money on elections.  For instance, 
Assembly Bill A1682 would abolish legislative leadership commit-
tees,206 reduce the maximum annual contribution to state parties 
from $25,000 to $12,500, reduce the yearly contribution limit to 
county parties from $37,000 to $10,000, and reduce the contribution 
limit to individual candidates from $7200 to $5000 per year.207  There 
is also a bill which would make the contribution limit $2000 for all 
elective offices, bringing New Jersey’s campaign limits comparable to 
federal limits.208
As Governor Corzine and Senate President Codey have made 
public pledges to reform New Jersey’s culture of corruption,209 and 
there is significant public support for such bills, it is possible that the 
legislature and the governor will seek to implement a reform package 
in the near future.210
 202 A1489, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 203 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.3a (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 204 A1489, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 205 A1484, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 206 See supra Parts III.E & III.G. 
 207 A1682, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 208 S1466, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 209 See Codey, supra note 4 (Governor Codey reiterating his pledge to ban pay-to-
play at all levels of government and institute a ban on wheeling); see also Jon Corzine, 
New Jersey Governor, State of the State Address (Jan. 9, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/approved/20070109.html) (“On ethics 
reform, we should push even further with a ban on wheeling and pay-to-play at all 
levels of government.”). 
 210 It should be noted that Republicans in electorally competitive legislative dis-
tricts proposed several of these reform bills.  As the Assembly and Senate are cur-
rently under Democratic control, it is doubtful that many of these proposals will ever 
come up for a vote in front of the full legislature, as it would grant a major legislative 
victory to the Republican opposition.  See, e.g., A102, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006); 
A691, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006); A1484, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006); 
A1487, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006); A1489, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).  As-
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B. The Connecticut Model 
In June 2004, two months before Governor McGreevey’s resigna-
tion in New Jersey, John Rowland, the Republican Governor of Con-
necticut, resigned amid a scandal involving state contractors doing 
work on his home.211  Rowland’s successor as governor, M. Jodi Rell, 
and the Connecticut Legislature passed a series of campaign finance 
reforms, similar in many respects to the reform efforts instituted by 
Governors McGreevey and Codey during New Jersey’s transition of 
power.212  The subsequent legislation passed by Connecticut and New 
Jersey took varied approaches to correcting a similar problem: the 
pervasive influence of government contractor campaign donations in 
state politics. 
The Connecticut statutory framework is more restrictive than 
New Jersey’s version, holding “[n]o business entity213 shall make any 
contributions or expenditures to, or for the benefit of, any candi-
date’s campaign for election to any public office,”214 and goes on to 
bar not only these corporate donations, but also donations from any 
“officer, director, owner, limited or general partner or holder of 
stock constituting five per cent or more of the total outstanding stock 
of any class of the business entity.”215  Contrasted with New Jersey’s 
laws that allow businesses to make donations (so long as the pro-
curement laws are followed) and do not bar most partners and direc-
tors from donating as well, it is clear that Connecticut’s legislation is 
more restrictive.216
Additionally, Connecticut legislators set more restrictive contri-
bution limits than New Jersey’s legislators passed.217  For example, in 
semblyman (now Senator) Bill Baroni (R-Mercer/Middlesex) was a sponsor on each 
of these bills.  See id.  Baroni represents one of the few districts with a two-party legis-
lative delegation.  New Jersey Legislative Roster, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ 
members/roster.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2008). 
 211 William Yardley, Under Pressure, Rowland Resigns Governor’s Post, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2004, at A1. 
 212 Avi Salzman, On the Lookout for Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at 14CN-19 
(giving an overview of Connecticut’s recent reform efforts). 
 213 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-601(8) (West 2002 & Supp. forthcoming) (defining 
“business entity” to include corporations, partnerships, etc.). 
 214 Id. § 9-613(a) (emphasis added). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. § 9-615.  Connecticut does allow business political committees to make do-
nations, with limits up to $5000 for gubernatorial candidates.  See id. 
 217 See Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission, Contribution Lim-
its, http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/contribution_limits_2007.pdf (last visited Apr. 
17, 2008) (posting an updated chart for current contribution limits). 
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New Jersey, a business-created PAC can donate up to $7200218 to a 
candidate (for any level of elective office), while a similar PAC in 
Connecticut would be limited to a $5000 donation to a gubernatorial 
candidate, $1500 to a State legislative candidate, and as little as $375 
to a city council candidate.219  Since Connecticut and New Jersey are 
in the same region, have similarly wealthy populations (compared to 
the rest of the nation), and operate within the same New York City 
media market, it would be difficult to argue that New Jersey candi-
dates require such larger donations than candidates in Connecticut 
require to run similar campaigns.  If one is to believe that more re-
strictive contribution limits are a positive reform,220 then certainly 
New Jersey’s limits are higher than is necessary. 
C. The Argument for Preserving the Status Quo 
Beyond those who call for the outright elimination of campaign 
finance restrictions, some feel New Jersey’s current pay-to-play law is 
working, and further reform is not needed.  These anti-reformists 
want to preserve the status quo, fearing that further tightening the 
system will have negative repercussions.221  Anti-reformists also note 
that “donations to the Democratic State Committee . . . dropped sev-
enty-eight percent from its recent peak in 2001 through 2005, and 
contractor donations to the PAC plunged eighty-six percent in the 
same period,” after the pay-to-play law was enacted.222
Furthermore, “[c]ontractor contributions to the ‘big six’ fund-
raising committees—the two state party committees and four legisla-
tive leadership PACs—fell from $5.4 million in 2001 to $1.8 million 
[in 2005].”223  Beyond the argument made above that the money is 
 218 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 219 See Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission, supra note 217. 
 220 See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 19, at 1736. 
 221 Donahue, supra note 198, at 1.  Assemblyman Joe Cryan, Chairman of the N.J. 
Democratic State Committee, said that the pay-to-play law is “chasing good people 
from the process. It’s as if we’ve made participating in the process something wrong, 
something un-American.”  Id. 
 222 Id. (“In 2004, one-third of the money the [Democratic State Committee] raised 
came from contractors; last year [2005], it was 6 percent.”). 
 223 Id.; see also James W. Prado Roberts & Gergory J. Volpe, Political Contributors 
Take Detour Around New Rules, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 2, 2007,  
at A1. 
Overall giving by all businesses and their political action committees to 
county and state parties has similarly dropped—from a peak of $20 mil-
lion in 2003 to just $3.3 million in 2005, and $1.6 million last year, ac-
cording to state Election Law Enforcement Commission records. In 
2003, the Democratic State Committee raised 70 percent of its $14 mil-
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merely flowing to other outlets and has not been eliminated from the 
system,224 there are other factors that may explain the above date, 
such as that Governor Corzine largely self-funded his campaign225 and 
perhaps was not as aggressive in fundraising as his predecessors. 
Senate President Codey noted that the legislature has “cut off so 
many avenues to raise money—at what point can only the  
rich run? . . .  At what point do you hinder people of regular means 
against someone with unlimited resources of their own?”226  Others 
have echoed this thought, noting that “restrictions on private donors 
give a bigger advantage to candidates like Corzine and his 2005 op-
ponent for governor, Republican Doug Forrester, who are wealthy 
enough to bankroll their own campaigns.”227
VI. THE REFORMS NEW JERSEY SHOULD ADOPT 
The pay-to-play reforms enacted through Governor McGreevey’s 
Executive Order and the subsequent legislation were perceived as a 
major victory for campaign reform in New Jersey.  Their effect, how-
ever, has been minimal.  Though it perhaps took several scandals and 
indictments of public officials228 to push the issue to the forefront, the 
influence of contractors on state candidates has, it appears, decreased 
since the enactment.229  More importantly, the pay-to-play statute and 
subsequent enabling legislation allows for county and local govern-
ments to begin more stringently regulating their own campaigns.  In 
this sense, the reforms have an aggregate positive effect on the sys-
tem, as many local and county governments have also passed more 
stringent reforms. 
But logically, pay-to-play and all campaign finance should be 
uniformly regulated by the state, rather than piecemeal, where every 
individual municipality and county has a unique campaign finance 
law.  The state is already the regulatory body for policing elections 
lion in receipts from businesses; last year businesses giving to that 
committee amounted to just 10 percent, according to ELEC records. 
Id. 
 224 Supra Part III. 
 225 Patrick D. Healy, Pity the Rich In Politics: They Tend To Fare Poorly, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2005, §1, at 37 (noting that Corzine spent $43 million on his gubernatorial 
victory). 
 226 Tom Moran, For Real Reform, Corzine Needs GOP, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
Oct. 13, 2006, at 23. 
 227 Donahue, supra note 198, at 1. 
 228 See NJ.com, supra note 16. 
 229 Donahue, supra note 198, at 1. 
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and filing reports.230  Furthermore, local and county elections are 
heavily influenced by state parties, PACs, and outside county commit-
tees not under the jurisdiction of individual towns and counties.231  
After leaving office, Governor McGreevey acknowledged that pro-
spective contractors made donations to entities other than his specific 
campaign committee in an effort to influence him.232  This is defini-
tive proof that campaign money in New Jersey changes hands and is 
transferred among campaign entities with the underlying purpose of 
influence.  Thus, it should be centrally regulated by the state. 
There is no valid policy reason why the state should not ban pay-
to-play at the local level, other than New Jersey’s history of allowing 
municipalities wide discretion in managing their own affairs.  How-
ever, this is a historical rather than a practical reason, and in today’s 
evolved system of campaigning, best practices would dictate that a 
uniform statewide ban on pay-to-play at all levels of government 
would be more practical than a patchwork system of different stan-
dards at local levels.  As the state already governs nearly all aspects of 
campaign law and regulation, it is counter-intuitive to argue that a va-
riety of local pay-to-play measures would be preferable or stronger 
than a statewide initiative.  As was discussed previously, Connecticut 
has a model that New Jersey legislators would be wise to study and 
possibly adopt. 
An absolutely necessary reform in New Jersey is a stronger provi-
sion to ban wheeling, as the current statutory language is grossly in-
adequate and does little to stop the large-scale transfers of cash 
among party committees during campaigns.  There is a counter-
argument against such a law, as some party insiders believe that grow-
ing a political party in an area where it is historically weak requires 
the influence and outside help from state leaders and county com-
mittees from where the party is historically strong.233  Such propo-
nents feel they are building a stronger statewide political base by in-
fusing weaker county and municipal committees with an influx of 
 230 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-8.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (stating all candi-
date committees must file with ELEC). 
 231 See supra Parts III.B and III.G. 
 232 MCGREEVEY WITH FRANCE, supra note 41, at 337. 
 233 Stainton, supra note 172, at A17 (noting that the Hudson County donor and 
the Ocean County Democratic Chairman in question defended the transfer of funds 
as the financially strong Democrats in Hudson County merely helping to strengthen 
the Democratic party in other parts of the state).  Every state legislator from Hudson 
County is a Democrat, while none of the state legislators from Ocean County is De-
mocrat.  See New Jersey Legislative Roster, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/members/ 
roster.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2008). 
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cash, as weaker county parties are unable to raise such funds them-
selves.234  This is a reasonable argument, though somewhat disin-
genuous.  Investigative reports have shown that the cash is not rou-
tinely going to underperforming counties, but rather back to the 
strong county committees, and that the transfers are largely used to 
circumvent the contribution limit laws, not to build the party.235
There is danger in some of the proposed reforms.  The pro-
posed bill to abolish legislative leadership committees altogether236 
goes too far.  Legislative leadership committees are invaluable tools 
for maintaining party order and discipline, though some would argue 
this stifles independence and is hardly a positive attribute.237  It is im-
perative that legislative leaders raise money to fund campaigns that 
would otherwise attract little attention.  To reform these committees, 
the Legislature should ban the legislative leadership committees’ 
power to transfer cash to anything other than a legislative candidate 
committee.  The ability of these specially created committees to wheel 
cash to county, municipal, and other state committees has harmed 
their image and is contrary to their statutory purpose. 
Another sensible proposal is to lower all the contribution limits.  
It is a somewhat bizarre system of campaign finance in which candi-
dates at the local level in New Jersey, seeking perhaps as little as a few 
thousand votes, can legally raise more money from an individual, a 
Continuing Political Committee (or PAC), and of course a business, 
than a candidate for U.S. Senate, Congress, or even President.238  The 
contribution limits, it would appear, are artificially high for candi-
 234 Stainton, supra note 172, at A17. 
 235 Id.  (noting that the money did not stay with the Ocean County Democrats for 
party building efforts but was transferred back to Jersey City council candidates al-
most immediately). 
 236 A1682, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 237 The Legislative Leadership Committees raise large amounts of money, and 
spend nearly all of it every cycle getting their members re-elected.  Since the leader 
of that caucus has complete control over this committee, they have complete discre-
tion as to which candidates will receive the money.  Arguably, this could force legisla-
tors to vote in lock-step with the leadership. 
 238 The federal limit for an individual donating to presidential, senate, or congres-
sional candidates is $2300.  Federal Election Commission, Quick Answers [hereinaf-
ter FEC Quick Answers], http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_general.shtml# 
How_much_can_I_contribute (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).  But importantly, a New 
Jersey candidate could receive up to $8200 from a CPC, while a Federal candidate 
could receive $5000, or perhaps as little as $2300, depending on the type of PAC.  
New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, Contribution Limits [hereinafter 
NJELEC Contribution Limits], http://www.elec.state.nj.us/forcandidates/elect_ 
limits.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). 
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dates for minor elected offices,239 and it would be logical and appro-
priate to bring New Jersey’s contribution limits in line with the fed-
eral limits.  Opponents of this measure would argue that such limits 
are unneeded, as there are less stringent restrictions on campaign 
donations in neighboring states, such as Pennsylvania, which do have 
the same aura of corruption as New Jersey. 240
What policy argument can be made for having individual contri-
bution limits greater than the current $2300 limit for individual con-
tributions and $5000 PAC contributions to federal candidates?  Cam-
paign spending reports confirm that federal candidates have no 
problem raising a sufficient amount of funds.241  It seems evident that 
something is awry when an individual in New Jersey can contribute 
$2600 to a candidate for minor office in New Jersey, but only $2300 
to a Presidential candidate.  Moreover, a business can directly con-
tribute $2600 to a New Jersey candidate, but nothing to a federal 
candidate; a CPC could contribute $8200 to a New Jersey candidate, 
but a PAC only $5000 to a federal candidate; and other party commit-
tees (county, state, or legislative leadership committee) can contrib-
ute unlimited amounts to a New Jersey candidate committee, but these 
same party committees may only contribute $5000 combined to federal 
candidates.242
This is not to say that the federal system is perfect—far from it.  
However, aligning all facets of New Jersey’s campaign finance system 
with the current federal law would be a positive step.  Drastically scal-
ing back contribution limits to individual candidate committees, as 
well as tighter restrictions on corporate contributions (perhaps even 
a total ban) would, at minimum, show that New Jersey elected offi-
cials are committed to stemming corruption and the appearance of 
corruption. 
 239 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (finding that contribution limits are 
subject to the closest scrutiny and must be “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 
abridgment of associational freedoms”). 
 240 See 25 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 3241–3260 (West 1994 & Supp. 2006).  There is no 
Pennsylvania statute limiting the amount that can be contributed to a state candi-
date. 
 241 Anne Kornblut, Menendez Retains His Senate Seat; Lieberman Finally Prevails Over 
Lamont, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P6.  Senator Menendez raised $10 million on his 
own and received another $9 million from national Democrats, and Tom Kean Jr. 
raised over $5 million on his own and received about $5 million from the national 
GOP in their 2006 N.J. Senate race.  Id. 
 242 See FEC Quick Answers, supra note 238; NJELEC Contribution Limits, supra 
note 238. 
